

PAPERS




Implications of the Detroit Bankruptcy on Public Pension Plans in PA

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Pension Obligation Bonds: Principals vs. Agents Tension



Bankruptcy: As a tool

Bankruptcy is a very blunt instrument

It is used as a last resort; like operating with a meat cleaver.

It is a extraordinary means for resolving disputes that appear irresolvable under ordinary conditions

Detroit could have accomplished all negotiations outside of Federal Court

Bankruptcy is a legal frameworks with political influence

Looking to exit Bankruptcy in October 2014

Detroit Bankruptcy: Background

Detroit has roughly 700,000 citizens and 100,000 creditors

Detroit is in solvent and not sustainable

Filed Federal Law Chapter 9 in July 2013

Players: Emergency Manager Kevyn Orr, U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Steven Rhode, Gov. Rick Snyder

Detroit needs to restructure \$18 billion long term obligations

Negotiations have favored pension holders over bondholders

State's Constitution protects pension holders

Bankruptcy: Conflicts

Bankruptcy rules require equal treatment for creditors

Detroit's pension beneficiaries are receiving cash from the State and private foundations that will not be shared with the bondholders

Bond Holders | Bond Insurers: Settlement

\$3.7 trillion municipal bond market

AMBAC, MBIA insured Detroit's unsecured general obligation bonds

Insurance exposure is roughly \$500 million

General Obligations will receive 75% on the dollar

Limited Obligations will receive 15% on the dollar

Pension Holders:

Judge rules that pension benefits could be reduced

20,000 retirees, 10,000 active employees

Retired Police and Fire benefits would remain intact

Municipal retirees expect a 4.5% cut in benefits

COLAs will be reduced moving forward for active

Detroit has a five year collective bargaining agreement in place with 14 unions including the American Federal of State, County and Municipal Employees

Taxpayers: Current and Future

\$800 million from State and private foundations

Dollars will support retiree pension plan

Spare the sale of art at the Detroit Art Museum

Pension Obligation Bonds:

2005 | 2006 Taxable Pension Obligation Bonds

Issued \$1.4 billion "certificates of participation"

Circumnavigation of the Detroit statutory debt limit

Swaps transaction with counter parties (banks)

Detroit gave banks a lien on casinos revenues

Creditors:

100,000 creditors

Bankruptcy: Key Take Aways

Interested parties are watching the Detroit bankruptcy closely

Bankruptcy is a one-time chance to reset the playing field

Key principals are taxpayers, bondholders and pension holders

Detroit needs to rebuild and attract new entrants to the city

Rating agencies will continue to scrutinize the CAFR documents

Municipality will need to defend and protect their credit rating

Risk Management will be a key service for Pensions and OPEB funds

Detroit Bankruptcy:

Appendix

Rating Agency:

Changes to Municipal Methodology

S&P reports a change in March 2012

Reports Outstanding Debt plus Pension Deficit at 8%

Fitch reports a change in April 2012

Reports Outstanding Debt plus Pension Deficit at 8% | 6% | 4%

Moody's reports a change in July 2012

a.Reports Outstanding Debt plus Pension Deficit at Corp AA

Detroit Bankruptcy:

Financial Review | Description | Strengths | Negatives

DESCRIPTION

Most populous city in MI and the seat of Wayne County

Population - 700,000

Current unemployment rate of 16.3% vs national 7.57%

Market value per capita - \$26,400,

Debt 21% of mkt value + need to borrow \$300 for swap termination payment

Revenue Sources: income taxes (21%), property taxes (13%), state-shared revenues (16%), wagering taxes (16%), utility

Liabilities: Pension \$3.5bn, OPEB \$5.7bn, Bonds (GO and Revenue) \$9.2bn

Revenue bonds - \$5.95bn (65%), GO bonds - \$3.26bn (35%); Insured debt - \$6.8bn, Uninsured - \$1.0bn

Secured obligations - \$7.23. Impaired - \$1.98bn. Possibly impaired (OPEB and Pension)- \$9.19bn

Utility system (water & sewer) system -most significant and monetizable asset

Has 2x as many pensioners as employees, more spent on retirees than workers, spend on retirees up 46% since FY'01

Filed CH 9 un Jul'13; Emergency Manager - Kevyn Orr

Strategy: priority to restoring city services over addressing bondholders' complaints; cuts to the value of some bond

Revenue FY'12 \$1.1bn; Fund Balances neg. \$270mm; Total Assets \$247mm

STRENGTHS

+ Broad and diverse economy

NEGATIVES

- Very weak economy with very low current and projected per capita buying income
- Ongoing population decline
- Political instability and inability to execute structural reforms
- Uncertain access to liquidity, inability to raise revenue or cut expense:
- 10 yr record of large negative GF reserves
- Dramatic drop in property values--> drop in property taxes
- Track record of disastrous management esp. starting since mayor Kilpatrick
- Pension is 19% of city's total debt load, Kilpatrick's high finance swap 20% of debt
- Unfunded OPEB of \$5.7bn, OPEB pmts in FY'12 \$262mm or 16.5% of gov'tal expenditures

Detroit Bankruptcy: Financial Review of General Fund

| FINANCIALS - General Fund | | | | | | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|-------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| \$MM | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 | FY 2008 | FY 2007 | FY 2006 |
| Balance Sheet | | | | | | | |
| + Cash & Near Cash | 16.1 | 12.4 | 1.9 | 5.2 | 166.6 | 58.6 | 49.8 |
| + Acct Receivable | 14.4 | -14.8 | -2.9 | -10.5 | 3.6 | -6.3 | -18.5 |
| Total Assets | 246.9 | 290.2 | 395.9 | 418.5 | 545.3 | 421.5 | 391.2 |
| + Accounts Payable | 18.9 | 23.2 | 21.1 | 13.9 | 16.5 | 14.9 | 20.1 |
| Total Liabilities | 516.4 | 438.2 | 487.0 | 685.2 | 687.0 | 512.9 | 498.4 |
| + Unreserved General Fund | -291.4 | -169.7 | -135.7 | -331.9 | -219.2 | -155.6 | -173.7 |
| Total Fund Balances | -269.5 | -148.1 | -91.1 | -266.7 | -141.7 | -91.4 | -107.2 |
| Total Liabilities and Fund Balances | 246.9 | 290.2 | 395.9 | 418.5 | 545.3 | 421.5 | 391.2 |
| Statement of Revenues, Expenditures | & Changes i | n Fund Bala | nce | | | | |
| + Income Tax Revenues | 233.0 | 228.3 | 216.5 | 240.8 | 276.5 | 278.3 | 284.1 |
| + Property Tax Revenues | 147.8 | 182.7 | 143.0 | 163.7 | 155.2 | 183.8 | 185.3 |
| + Other Tax Revenues | 407.6 | 473.5 | 502.5 | 500.5 | 492.1 | 519.9 | 508.7 |
| + Charges for Services | 149.2 | 154.9 | 154.1 | 167.4 | 193.3 | 243.5 | 184.4 |
| + Federal Grants | 61.6 | 65.4 | 51.3 | 45.8 | 50.2 | 52.3 | 9.4 |
| Total Revenue | 1,102.3 | 1,220.3 | 1,188.0 | 1,268.4 | 1,303.4 | 1,487.4 | 1,400.9 |
| - Community Development Expenses | 176.5 | 180.4 | 237.1 | 305.2 | 298.2 | 310.2 | 233.2 |
| - Health Expenses | 73.7 | 73.0 | 86.4 | 81.5 | 82.0 | 76.5 | 96.2 |
| - Public Safety Expenses | 629.9 | 695.5 | 603.7 | 619.3 | 619.5 | 617.6 | 658.8 |
| - Interest Debt Service | 0.9 | 2.6 | 7.5 | 2.5 | 3.4 | 7.1 | 5.6 |
| Total Operating Expenses | 996.4 | 1,070.2 | 1,068.9 | 1,155.9 | 1,181.4 | 1,278.1 | 1,410.1 |
| + Excess (Deficiency) of Revenues Ov | 105.8 | 150.1 | 119.0 | 112.5 | 122.1 | 209.3 | -9.2 |

Detroit Bankruptcy: Financial Review of Government Fund

| FINANCIALS - Government Fund | | | | | | | |
|------------------------------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|
| \$MM | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 | FY 2008 | FY 2007 | FY 2006 |
| Statement of Net Assets | | | | | | | |
| + Cash & Near Cash | 390.2 | 156.4 | 136.2 | 211.7 | 417.0 | 257.5 | 86.1 |
| + Acct Receivable | 431.6 | 453.6 | 507.2 | 481.8 | 357.2 | 468.5 | 429.1 |
| + Total Capital Assets | 6,841.9 | 6,852.5 | 7,026.9 | 6,977.4 | 6,832.8 | 6,959.3 | 6,856.0 |
| Total Assets | 10,311.2 | 10,030.1 | 10,371.7 | 10,399.5 | 10,729.6 | 10,963.7 | 10,270.5 |
| + Accounts Payable | 263.4 | 278.8 | 185.2 | 203.1 | 259.3 | 249.1 | 308.1 |
| + S-T Debt | N/A | N/A | 35.5 | 223.6 | 129.6 | 129.4 | N/A |
| + L-T Debt | 9,113.0 | 8,366.5 | 163.7 | 154.6 | 153.5 | 146.3 | 246.9 |
| Total Liabilities | 10,683.2 | 10,059.1 | 10,106.6 | 9,499.4 | 9,465.8 | 9,223.5 | 8,569.5 |
| + Restricted Net Assets | 535.8 | 413.5 | 378.2 | 490.0 | 462.8 | 424.4 | 414.9 |
| + Unrestricted Net Assets | -2,759.0 | -1,590.4 | -1,612.6 | -920.2 | -501.3 | -426.9 | -230.9 |
| Total Net Assets | -372.0 | -29.0 | 265.1 | 900.1 | 1,263.7 | 1,740.2 | 1,701.1 |
| Statement of Activities | | | | | | | |
| + Property Tax Revenues | 216.9 | 235.9 | 218.0 | 231.4 | 225.6 | 241.4 | 243.6 |
| + Income Tax Revenues | 233.0 | 228.3 | 216.5 | 240.8 | 276.5 | 278.3 | 284.1 |
| + Other Tax Revenues | 411.2 | 478.4 | 482.1 | 503.9 | 523.7 | 522.4 | 573.8 |
| + Charges for Services | 1,117.7 | 1,063.8 | 1,010.1 | 1,095.0 | 1,076.4 | 1,091.1 | 1,018.6 |
| + Operating Grants | 403.9 | 448.3 | 431.7 | 385.3 | 385.6 | 353.9 | 318.9 |
| Total Revenue | 2,302.2 | 2,462.9 | 2,470.7 | 2,545.0 | 2,525.5 | 2,727.1 | 2,674.7 |
| - Health Expenses | 142.6 | 170.2 | 170.8 | 158.9 | 158.8 | 153.4 | 177.4 |
| - Public Safety Expenses | 800.2 | 816.9 | 779.6 | 789.1 | 761.9 | 633.2 | 681.1 |
| - Utilities Expenses | 826.7 | 862.8 | 778.2 | 800.0 | 789.9 | 762.8 | 593.5 |
| Total Operating Expenses | 2,645.2 | 2,757.0 | 2,737.5 | 2,908.7 | 2,842.8 | 2,688.0 | 2,599.2 |
| Change In Net Assets | -343.0 | -294.1 | -266.8 | -363.7 | -317.3 | 39.1 | 75.6 |

Detroit Bankruptcy: Financial Review of Pension Fund

| PENSION GENERAL | | | | | | | |
|-----------------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| \$MM | FY 2012 | FY 2011 | FY 2010 | FY 2009 | FY 2008 | FY 2007 | FY 2006 |
| FV of Plan Assets Actuarial | 6,885.1 | 6,885.1 | 7,357.6 | 7,957.4 | 7,893.8 | 7,361.2 | 6,980.3 |
| PBO Actuarial | 7,528.8 | 7,528.8 | 7,910.4 | 7,680.6 | 7,526.0 | 7,243.3 | 7,127.8 |
| Underfunding | -643.7 | -643.8 | -552.8 | 276.8 | 367.7 | 117.9 | -147.5 |
| Funded Ratio % | 91% | 91% | 93% | 104% | 105% | 102% | 98% |